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IYANU LIPEDE

Let’s Hear it For Sound Marks: Trademark
Protection in Copyrighted Songs
ABSTRACT
Trademarks play an indispensable role in brand protection for both
individuals and companies, and musicians are no different. While most
musicians enforce their brands through traditional trademarks, like words
and logos, the musician Pitbull succeeded in registering nontraditional,
sound trademarks in October 2019. Sound marks are not new; in fact, the
first sound mark was registered in 1947. However, Pitbull’s registered marks
differ from other sound marks. While most sound marks are separate from
the product they identify, Pitbull’s registered marks are found in the product
they identify—the song. Accordingly, this type of mark implicates both
trademark and copyright law.
As this type of sound mark is predicted to grow in popularity, the
implications of copyright and trademark law on such marks must be
considered. This Comment provides a brief history of sound trademarks. It
then outlines the differences between trademarks and copyrights and
discusses the implications of these differences for sound marks in
copyrighted music. Specifically, this Comment discusses issues musiciantrademark-owners may face enforcing and licensing their marks.
Pitbull’s sound marks are not the first instance of overlap of copyright and
trademark law. However, due to lower courts misunderstanding the Supreme
Court’s holding in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Film Corp., some courts
have precluded concurrent copyright and trademark infringement claims.
Such a holding may render this type of sound mark unenforceable.
Furthermore, the licensing requirements of trademarks and copyrights differ
significantly. While trademark law requires trademark owners to maintain
pushing quality control over their licensees, copyright law has no such
requirement. Additionally, courts have inconsistent and contradictory
requirements for trademark licensing, leaving trademark owners with little
to no guidance on what constitutes a valid license.
This Comment concludes by proposing two solutions to issues arising
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from this unique mark. First, this Comment calls on the Supreme Court to
clarify its holding in Dastar. Second, this Comment proposes an amendment
to the Lanham Act that would dispense with the quality control requirement
for sound marks.

AUTHOR
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16; J.D. Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2022); B.A.,
Government, Oral Roberts University (2017). I would like to thank my family
for their love and continual support. I would also like to thank Wesley Carter
for introducing me to trademark law and Dr. Curtis Ellis for his guidance as
I developed my writing skills.
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COMMENT
LET’S HEAR IT FOR SOUND MARKS: TRADEMARK PROTECTION IN
COPYRIGHTED SONGS
Iyanu Lipede†
I. INTRODUCTION
In October 2019, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO)
issued two trademark registrations to the musician Pitbull.1 Musicians often
develop and maintain their brands through trademark law;2 however,
Pitbull’s registered marks were notably different. While other artists have
registered traditional marks, such as words or logos,3 Pitbull endeavored—
and succeeded—to register nontraditional, sound trademarks.4 Although
these were not the first sound marks the USPTO granted, these marks differ
from the rest.
Pitbull’s registered marks are noteworthy for multiple reasons. One major
reason is that other musicians are expected to follow suit in pursuing the
registration of sound marks.5 Additionally, while most sound marks identify
the product, they are separate from the product itself.6 In contrast, Pitbull’s
†
Student Development Editor, Liberty University Law Review, Volume 16; J.D.
Candidate, Liberty University School of Law (2022); B.A., Government, Oral Roberts
University (2017). I would like to thank my family for their love and continual support. I
would also like to thank Wesley Carter for introducing me to trademark law and Dr. Curtis
Ellis for his guidance as I developed my writing skills.
1
The mark is a sound. The mark consists of a man yelling “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO” in
falsetto with “E” drawn out followed by a “U” sound, Registration No. 5,877,076; The mark is
a sound. The mark consists of a man yelling “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO” in falsetto with “E”
drawn out followed by a “U” sound, Registration No. 5,877,077.
2
See generally Suzanne Kessler, The Non-Recording, Non-Artist “Recording Artist”:
Expanding the Recording Artist’s Brand into Non-Music Arenas, 20 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L.
515, 550–51 (2017).
3
See, e.g., 50 CENT Registration 5,486,790; BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN Registration No.
4,454,482; JUSTIN BIEBER Registration No. 4,396,533; RIHANNA Registration No.
4,968,108; TAYLOR SWIFT Registration No. 5,805,872.
4
The mark is a sound. The mark consists of a man yelling “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO” in
falsetto with “E” drawn out followed by a “U” sound, Registration No. 5,877,076; The mark is
a sound. The mark consists of a man yelling “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO” in falsetto with “E”
drawn out followed by a “U” sound, Registration No. 5,877,077.
5
See Justin F. McNaughton et al., EEEEEEEYOOOOOO!: Reflections on Protecting
Pitbull’s Famous Grito, 2 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 179, 180 (2020).
6
Id. at 187.
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sound marks allow consumers to experience the marks while also
experiencing the product itself—the song. The trademark is embedded in the
copyrighted song.7 Because this type of mark implicates both trademark and
copyright law, problems are sure to arise.
While Pitbull’s registered marks are noteworthy, they also raise questions
as to enforcement and licensing of this type of mark. Due to a
misunderstanding of the Supreme Court’s Dastar holding, some lower courts
have extended the Court’s holding to preclude concurrent claims for
copyright and trademark infringement.8 Under such an expansive view of
Dastar, courts may bar owners of sound marks in music recordings from
bringing their trademark infringement claims. In addition, the licensing
requirements of trademarks and copyrighted music differ significantly, with
trademark licensing requiring that trademark owners exert quality control
over their licensees and products.9 Courts have inconsistent and
contradictory requirements for trademark licensing, leaving trademark
owners with little to no guidance on what constitutes a valid license.10
Further, music licensing is complex and expensive,11 and with the added
trademark quality control requirement, artists seeking to license songs
containing trademarks may run into obstacles.
This Comment provides a brief history of sound trademarks. It then
outlines the differences between trademarks and copyrights and discusses the
implications of these differences for this type of mark. Specifically, this
Comment focuses on enforcement and licensing of sound marks in sound
recordings. This Comment concludes by offering two solutions to the
perplexing problem posed by Pitbull’s registered sound marks. First, this
Comment suggests that the Supreme Court clarify its holding in Dastar to
avoid further confusion among lower courts. Second, this Comment
proposes an amendment to the Lanham Act. The amendment will dispose of
the quality control requirement for sound marks to resolve issues that
typically arise from sound marks.

7

Id.
See, e.g., Conf. Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., No. 3:2006-76, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46955, at *37–39 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Lions Gate Ent., Inc. v. TD Ameritrade Servs. Co.,
170 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
9
Irene Calboli, The Sunset of “Quality Control” in Modern Trademark Licensing, 57 AM.
U. L. REV. 341, 356 (2007).
10
Id. at 374.
11
Thomas M. Lenard & Lawrence J. White, Moving Music Licensing into the Digital Era:
More Competition and Less Regulation, 23 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 133, 134 (2016).
8
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II. BACKGROUND
In his music, Pitbull often characterizes himself as “Mr. Worldwide” or
“Mr. 305” and marks his songs with his Spanish-language catchphrase,
“Dale,” or his familiar yell, “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO!”12 This persona remains
the same whether it is in his own song or whether he is a featured artist in
another musician’s song.13 Pitbull’s persona as “Mr. Worldwide” and “Mr.
305” extends past his music; however, his yell is “almost exclusively used” in
his music.14 Accordingly, fans and non-fans alike recognize his yell,
acknowledging it as an essential element to his brand.15
In 2017, Colombian singer, J Balvin, and producer, Willy William,
released the song “Mi Gente,” which features a yell similar to that of Pitbull.16
The yell is first heard fifty-two seconds into the song and reoccurs
throughout the song’s duration.17 The song gained instant success, with fans
and music journalists almost immediately assuming that Pitbull was a
featured artist in the song.18 Consequently, Pitbull received praise for this
mistaken guest appearance.19 Pitbull first responded by releasing a remix of
the song.20 The artist used the remix to acknowledge fans’ confusion stating,
“since everybody thought that I was on the record, I think it’s only right that
I jump on the remix.”21 Despite this good-natured response, Pitbull also
chose to protect his yell.22 His chosen mode of protection was a trademark,
and after an eighteen-month battle, the USPTO registered his sound marks.23
12

McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 180.
Id. at 183.
14
Savannah Merceus, [Insert Yell Here]: Rapper Pitbull Receives Trademark Registration
for “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO!” Sound Mark, IP INTEL. (May 7, 2020),
https://www.ipintelligencereport.com/2020/05/07/insert-yell-here-rapper-pitbull-receivestrademark-registration-for-eeeeeeeyoooooo-sound-mark/.
15
McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 183.
16
J Balvin, Willy William—Mi Gente (Official Video), YOUTUBE (June 29, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wnJ6LuUFpMo.
17
Id.
18
McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 180–81.
19
Id.
20
See urkel 15, J Balvin, Willy William, Pitbull “Mi Gente” (woldwild & urkel15 remix)
extender version, YOUTUBE (Aug. 30, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tPvu12EUh0w.
21
Id.
22
McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 190.
23
The mark is a sound. The mark consists of a man yelling “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO” in
falsetto with “E” drawn out followed by a “U” sound, Registration No. 5,877,076; The mark is
a sound. The mark consists of a man yelling “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO” in falsetto with “E”
drawn out followed by a “U” sound, Registration No. 5,877,077.
13
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Sound trademarks, such as Pitbull’s registered marks, may be used as a
tool to connect with consumers effectively.24 Yet, trademark law may not be
the only means of intellectual property protection for a single product.
Generally, courts hold that a given product may be protected simultaneously
by more than one type of intellectual property.25 The fact that trademarks,
patents, and copyrights may overlap in subject matter often causes
confusion.26 The varying forms of intellectual property provide different
types of protection and serve different purposes.27 Consequently, the criteria
for protection, the tests for infringement, and the requirements for licensing
differ greatly between these types of intellectual property.28
A trademark aims to identify the source of goods to prevent customer
confusion.29 A copyright, on the other hand, protects an author’s right in
creative works.30 Sounds may fall into the subject matter of both copyrights
and trademarks.31 One author noted that in relation to sounds, the difference
in intellectual property types is manifested in music.32 Prior to the
registration of Pitbull’s marks, courts noted that songs could be trademarked
when they served as a symbol or device to identify a person’s goods or
services; however, courts simultaneously acknowledged that a song could not

24

See Daniel R. Bumpus, Comment, Bing, Bang, Boom: An Analysis of In Re Vertex
Group LLC and the Struggle for Inherent Distinctiveness in Sound Marks Made During a
Product’s Normal Course of Operation, 21 FED. CIR. B.J. 245, 249 (2011).
25
Kohler Co. v. Moen, Inc., 12 F.3d 632, 638 (7th Cir. 1993); Ward v. Andrews McMeel
Pub., LLC, 963 F. Supp. 2d 222, 236 (S.D.N.Y. 2013); In re DC Comics, Inc., 689 F.2d 1042,
1052 (C.C.P.A. 1982).
26
See 1 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 6:1 (5th ed. 2020).
27
See id. § 6:5.
28
See Prestonettes, Inc. v. Coty, 264 U.S. 359, 368 (1924) (“[A trademark] does not confer
a right to prohibit the use of the word or words. It is not a copyright. . . . A trade-mark only
gives the right to prohibit the use of it so far as to protect the owner’s good will against the
sale of another’s product as his.”); Quality Inns Int’l, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 695 F. Supp.
198, 218 (D. Md. 1988) (“Unlike a copyright, mere reproduction of a trademark is not an
infringement.”); see also 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 6:6 (providing a chart outlining the
relationship between copyright law, trademark law, and patent law to give an overview of
differences between various types of federal statutory intellectual property protections).
29
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 2:1.
30
EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors, Cosmopulos, Inc., No. 99-7922, 2000
U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, at *15 (2d Cir. Dec. 1, 2000).
31
Bumpus, supra note 24, at 250; see EMI Catalogue P’ship, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761,
at *18.
32
Bumpus, supra note 24, at 250.
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be a trademark for itself.33 So, by granting Pitbull the first known sound
trademark for musical sound recordings,34 the USPTO made Pitbull a
pioneer in his field.
A.

The History of Sound Marks

A trademark35 is “any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination
thereof” used by an individual or company in commerce to identify,
distinguish, and indicate the source of the goods they produce.36 While
trademarks were traditionally limited to word or image marks, they have
been expanded to include colors, sounds, and many other devices.37 As
defined by the Trademark Manual of Examining Procedure (TMEP), “[a]
sound mark identifies and distinguishes a product or service through audio
rather than visual means.”38 Sound trademarks are often grouped with other
trademarks that cannot be visually represented.39 This group, which also
includes scents, is often referred to as “sensory” trademarks40 and is part of
the larger universe of nontraditional marks.41 Consumers often easily identify
traditional marks, such as a brand’s name or logo, as legally enforceable
trademarks; however, consumers may not easily identify a nontraditional
mark.42 While sound marks were not traditionally afforded trademark
protection, today, they are growing in popularity and considered “probably
the most memorable nontraditional trademarks.”43
In 1947, the National Broadcast Company (NBC) filed the first sound

33
EMI Catalgoue P’ship, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, at *18; Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc.,
251 F.3d 56, 62 (2d Cir. 2001); G.M.L., Inc. v. Mayhew, 188 F. Supp. 2d 891, 897 (M.D. Tenn.
2002).
34
McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 189.
35
Although trademark law distinguishes between a “trademark” as the term for goods,
and “service mark” as the term for services, this Comment will use the term “trademark” to
refer to both trademarks and service marks.
36
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
37
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, §§ 7:100–7:109.
38
TMEP § 1202.15 (July 2021).
39
See McNaughton et al, supra note 5, at 184.
40
Id.
41
Jerome Gilson & Anne Gilson LaLonde, Cinnamon Buns, Marching Ducks and CherryScented Racecar Exhaust: Protecting Nontraditional Trademarks, 95 TRADEMARK REP. 773,
774 (2005).
42
Id. at 774; Melissa E. Roth, Note, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed,
Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional Trademark Registrations, 27 CARDOZO L.
REV. 457, 460 (2005).
43
Gilson & LaLonde, supra note 41, at 801.
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trademark to be registered in the United States.44 A little over thirty years
later, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (TTAB) affirmed that a sound
could be a trademark.45 The TTAB has noted that sounds may be registered
when they are:
[A]rbitrary, unique[,] or distinctive and can be used in a
manner so as to attach to the mind of the listener and be
awakened on later hearing in a way that would indicate for
the listener that a particular product or service was coming
from a particular, even if anonymous, source.46
As with other trademarks, a prerequisite for obtaining a sound mark is a
showing of distinctiveness.47 Similar to traditional word trademarks, sound
marks are graded on a spectrum of distinctiveness. For word marks, generic
marks, having no distinctiveness, are on one end of the spectrum while
fanciful marks, the most distinctive, are on the other end of the spectrum.48
Similarly, the TTAB has distinguished commonplace, or familiar sounds,
which are not inherently distinctive, from inherently distinctive, arbitrary
sounds.49 Commonplace sounds are sounds that listeners have been exposed
to under different circumstances.50 Examples of such sounds include alarm
clocks, security alarms, telephones, and even Pitbull’s registered marks.51
When a sound is commonplace, a trademark applicant must provide proof
that the sound has acquired distinctiveness.52 In other words, there must be
evidence that consumers recognize the sound and associate it with a
particular product or service.53

44
McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 184; The mark comprises the musical notes G, E, C
played on chimes, Registration No. 523,616. NBC did not renew this mark, and the mark
expired in 1992. NBC filed a new trademark application for the same sound in 1970, and the
new mark was registered the following year. The mark comprises a sequence of chime-like
musical notes which are in the key of C and sound the noted G, E, C, the “G” being the one
just below middle C, the “E” the one just above middle C, and the “C” being middle C,
thereby to identify applicant’s broadcasting service, Registration No. 916,522.
45
In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
46
In re Vertex Grp. LLC, 89 U.S.P.Q.2d 1694, 1700 (T.T.A.B. 2009).
47
Id. See infra Section II.B.1.
48
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 573 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976).
49
In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 563.
50
TMEP, supra note 38, § 1202.15.
51
Id.; see McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 186.
52
See McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 186.
53
Ride the Ducks, LLC v. Duck Boat Tours, Inc., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1269, 1275
(T.T.A.B. 2005).
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Inherently distinctive sounds do not require such proof.54 Examples of
registered inherently distinctive sounds include NBC’s chime, MGM’s lion
roar, and the New York Stock Exchange Bell.55 Sound marks differ from some
other nontraditional marks in this respect. Courts have consistently barred
some categories of nontraditional marks from being inherently distinctive.56
A look at color marks is demonstrative.57 Because colors are familiar and do
not immediately signify the source of a product, those seeking to register a
color mark must always show acquired distinctiveness.58 Once consumers are
able to identify the color as part of a brand, then the owner may receive
trademark protection. Conversely, regardless of whether we often hear the
sound, a sound may be inherently distinctive if it is not commonplace.59
At the time of the TTAB’s landmark decision in In re General Electric
Broadcasting Company, Inc., wherein the TTAB explicitly stated that sounds
may receive trademark protection, only nine other sounds were registered as
trademarks in the United States.60 After the TTAB’s declaration, fourteen
more were registered in the 1980s.61 Today, sound mark registration has
grown to 234 registered sound trademarks.62 While this number pales in

54

In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560, 563 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 186; The mark comprises the musical notes G, E, C
played on chimes, Registration No. 523,616; The mark comprises a lion roaring, Registration
No. 1,395,550; The THX logo theme consists of 30 voices over seven measures, starting in a
narrow range, 200 to 400 Hz, and slowly diverting to preselected itches encompassing three
octaves. The 30 voices begin at pitches between 200 Hz and 400 Hz and arrive at pre-selected
pitches spanning three octaves by the fourth measure. The highest pitch is slightly detuned
while there are double the number of voices of the lowest two pitches, Registration No.
1,872,866; The mark consists of the sound of a brass bell tuned to the pitch D, but with an
overtone of D-sharp, struck nine times at a brisk tempo, with the final tone allowed to ring
until the sound decays naturally. The rhythmic pattern is eight 16th notes and a quarter note;
the total duration, from the striking of the first tone to the end of the decay on the final one,
is just over 3 seconds, Registration No. 2,741,129.
56
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros. Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 212 (2005) (holding that
product design, like color, is not inherently distinctive); Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co.,
514 U.S. 159, 163 (1995) (holding that color is not inherently distinctive); In re N.V.
Organon, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639, 1650 (T.T.A.B 2006) (holding that flavor is not
inherently distinctive).
57
For an in-depth analysis of the distinctiveness of color marks, see Briana Reed, Note,
Color Monopoly: How Trademarking Colors in the Fashion Industry and Beyond Expands the
Lanham Act’s Purpose and Policy, 15 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 371 (2021).
58
Qualitex Co., 514 U.S. at 171–72.
59
Bumpus, supra note 24, at 253.
60
Id. at 248; In re Gen. Elec. Broad. Co., 199 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 560 (T.T.A.B. 1978).
61
Id.
62
McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 186.
55
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comparison to the number of registered word and design marks, it is evident
sound marks have gained popularity over the years.63
B.

Trademarks Compared to Copyrights

Because trademarks and copyrights serve different purposes,64 the two
forms of intellectual property deserve a separate analysis
1.

Trademarks

As previously noted, a trademark is “any word, name, symbol, or device,
or any combination thereof . . . used by a person . . . to identify and
distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, from those
manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods, even
if that source is unknown.”65 This broad definition of trademarks found in
the Lanham Act allows for a wide array of registered trademarks, including
words, phrases, colors, sounds, scents, and motions.66 The authority of
Congress to provide for the registration and to regulate the use of such
trademarks is found in the Commerce Clause.67 In accordance with the
Commerce Clause, the trademark must be used in commerce to be afforded
federal trademark protection.68 It must also be distinctive; that is, it must be
able to distinguish the products or services of the trademark owner from
others.69 Lastly, it must be used as a source identifier rather than as a mere
decoration.70
Once the basic requirements are met and the mark is registered, the
trademark owner can exclude others from using similar marks on similar
products. In doing so, the trademark owner and consumers are benefited.
The Supreme Court noted that “[t]he Lanham Act provides national
63

See id.; Bumpus, supra note 24, at 248.
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 2:1; EMI Catalogue P’ship v. Hill, Holliday, Connors,
Cosmopulos, Inc., No. 99-7922, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 30761, at *15 (2d Cir. Dec. 1, 2000).
65
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
66
See, e.g., Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995) (holding that
colors may be registered as trademarks); In re Clarke, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d 1238, 1239 (T.T.A.B.
1990) (approving the registration of a fragrance mark for thread and embroidery yarn).
67
TMEP, supra note 38, intro. But see Trademark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 95 (1879)
(invalidating a trademark statute promulgated under the Intellectual Property Clause and
leaving the possibility of the Commerce Clause open).
68
Lanham Act § 45, 15 U.S.C. § 1127; Iancu v. Brunetti, 139 S. Ct. 2294, 2297–98 (2019).
69
BILL SEITER & ELLEN SEITER, THE CREATIVE ARTIST’S LEGAL GUIDE: COPYRIGHT,
TRADEMARK AND CONTRACTS IN FILM AND DIGITAL MEDIA PRODUCTION 67 (2012).
70
In re Safariland Hunting Corp., 24 U.S.P.Q.2d 1380, 1381 (T.T.A.B. 1992) (“[T]he
mark [must] be used in such a manner that it would be readily perceived as identifying the
specified goods and distinguishing a single source or origin for the goods.”).
64
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protection of trademarks in order to secure to the owner of the mark the
goodwill of his business and to protect the ability of consumers to distinguish
among competing producers.”71 Appropriately, the owner is benefitted
because trademark registration provides constructive notice to other
providers of goods that the mark is already in use.72 Consumers are benefitted
because the registration prevents confusion as to the source of the goods they
purchase.73 In fact, the very “purpose of trademark laws is to prevent the use
of the same or similar marks in a way that confuses the public about the actual
source of the goods or service.”74 Accordingly, these two policies are the
underpinnings of the trademark licensing scheme.75
A trademark license allows a trademark owner to permit a third party to
use the trademark, whereas, without this permission, the third party would
be infringing on the mark.76 Trademark law requires that in licensing
trademarks, trademark owners maintain control of their licensees and the
quality of their products in order to protect customers from false
information.77 Failure of trademark owners to maintain such control of their
licensees or the quality of their products may lead to trademark cancellation
or abandonment.78
Without a license, a third party using an identical or similar mark in
identical or similar products may be infringing on a trademark owner’s rights
to her mark.79 In analyzing a claim for trademark infringement, courts utilize
a simple test: the likelihood of confusion.80 The test for infringement of a
federally registered mark asks whether the third party’s use of the mark is
likely to cause confusion, creates mistake, or deceive consumers.81 While
71

Park ’n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
Nat. Footwear, Ltd. v. Hart, Schaffner & Marx, 760 F.2d 1383, 1395 (3d Cir. 1985).
73
Id.
74
Star Fin. Servs., Inc. v. AASTAR Mortg. Corp., 89 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 1996).
75
See Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055; see also JAMES BOYLE & JENNIFER JENKINS,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: LAW & THE INFORMATION SOCIETY CASES AND MATERIALS 39 (5th
ed. 2021) (“[U]nderstanding the animating constitutional provisions [behind federal
intellectual property law], their goals, and their inner tensions, will shine a light on the way
that the courts interpret existing intellectual property law.”).
76
2 ANNE GILSON LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS § 6.01[1] (2020).
77
Kevin Parks, “Naked” Is Not a Four-Letter Word: Debunking the Myth of the “Quality
Control Requirement” in Trademark Licensing, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 531, 534–35 (1992).
78
Lanham Act §§ 14, 45, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1064, 1127.
79
2 LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 76, § 6.01[2].
80
Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 769 (1992); Xtreme Lashes, LLC v.
Xtended Beauty, Inc., 576 F.3d 221, 226 (5th Cir. 2009); Network Automation, Inc. v. Adv.
Sys. Concepts, Inc., 638 F.3d 1137, 1142 (9th Cir. 2011).
81
See Lanham Act §§ 32, 43, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125.
72
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courts may use different factors in conducting this test,82 the general principle
is the same: if the plaintiff proves the public is likely to be confused, mistaken,
or deceived, the defendant is liable for trademark infringement.83
2.

Copyrights

Although the term copyright lacks a statutory definition, it has been
defined as “the exclusive right or privilege of the author or proprietor to print
or otherwise multiply, publish, and vend copies of his or her literary, artistic,
or intellectual productions when secured by compliance with the copyright
statute.”84 The Constitution grants Congress the power to grant authors
exclusive rights to their works.85 This constitutional provision, commonly
known as the Copyrights and Patents Clause, solely authorizes Congress to
provide protection for authors without going as far as to provide substantive
protections for the author’s work.86 As such, copyright is a “creature of
statute”; whereas Congress is not required to provide copyright protection.87
Because the Constitution only grants Congress the power to provide such
protection,88 any rights authors hold, and any remedies arising from
infringement of those rights, exist solely because Congress chose to bestow
them.89
As evident in the Copyrights and Patents Clause, the purpose of copyrights
is “to promote the Progress of . . . [the] useful Arts.”90 Thus, copyright law
“ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general public through access

82
See, e.g., Dorpan, S.L. v. Hotel Meliá, Inc., 728 F.3d 55, 65 (1st Cir. 2013) (utilizing the
Pignons Factors); Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733, 740 (2d Cir. 1994) (utilizing
the Polaroid Factors); Checkpoint Sys. v. Check Point Software Techs., Inc., 269 F.3d 270,
280 (3d Cir. 2001) (utilizing the Lapp Factors); Petro Stopping Ctrs., L.P. v. James River
Petroleum, Inc., 130 F.3d 88, 91 (4th Cir. 1997) (utilizing the Pizzeria Uno Factors);
Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. v. Am. Eagle Outfitters, Inc., 280 F.3d 619, 646 (6th Cir.
2002) (utilizing the Frisch Factors); Frosty Treats, Inc. v. Sony Comput. Ent. Am., Inc., 426
F.3d 1001, 1008 (8th Cir. 2005) (utilizing the CoRect Factors); M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy
Ent., 421 F.3d 1073, 1080 (9th Cir. 2005) (utilizing the Sleekcraft Factors).
83
2 LALONDE & GILSON, supra note 76, § 5.01[1].
84
18 AM. JUR. 2D Copyright and Literary Prop. § 1 (2021).
85
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
86
Silvers v. Sony Pictures Ent., Inc., 402 F.3d 881, 883 (9th Cir. 2005).
87
Darden v. Peters, 488 F.3d 277, 284 (4th Cir. 2007).
88
Id.; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (“The Congress shall have Power To . . . promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]” (emphasis added)).
89
Darden, 488 F.3d at 284.
90
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; 18 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 84, § 2.
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to creative works.”91 While authors of copyrightable works are afforded a
monopoly on their creations, the Copyrights and Patents Clause expresses
that this monopoly may only be for “limited [t]imes.”92
As amended, the current Copyright Act provides copyright protection for
works created on or after January 1, 1978, for “a term consisting of the life of
the author and 70 years after the author’s death.”93 This extension does not
create a perpetual copyright94 in violation of the Constitution; instead, it
allows authors to reap their works’ economic value.95 Once the term ends, the
copyright expires, and the work becomes free for anyone to use in the public
domain.96 In contrast, trademarks may be perpetual as the owner may renew
the mark as long as the owner uses it in commerce.97 Essentially, the life of a
trademark is not tied to the owner’s life but simply to the use of the trademark
in commerce.98 Nevertheless, the purpose of the Copyright and Patents
Clause—promoting the progress of the Arts—is realized by such a limited
term. Authors are encouraged and rewarded for their creations, and others
are permitted to use, improve, and develop those works.99
Section 102 of the Copyright Act delineates the subject matter of
copyright. In accordance with the Copyright Act, copyright protection is only
afforded to “original works of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of
expression . . . from which they can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise
communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.”100
While the Copyright Act leaves “original” undefined,101 the Supreme Court
has stated that “the sine qua non102 of copyright is originality.”103 For
copyright purposes, originality means that the work was not copied from
91

Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1986 (2016) (quoting Fogerty v.
Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 527 (1994)).
92
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
93
17 U.S.C. § 302(a).
94
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 209 (2003).
95
See id. at 209 n.16.
96
Peter B. Hirtle, When is 1923 Going to Arrive and Other Complications of the U.S.
Public Domain, SEARCHER, Sept. 2012, at 22.
97
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 6:8.
98
See id. § 6:6.
99
Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1979, 1986 (2016).
100
17 U.S.C. § 102; Roth Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1109 (9th
Cir. 1970); Durham Indus. v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980).
101
17 U.S.C. § 102; H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 51 (1976).
102
An indispensable condition or thing; something on which something else necessarily
depends. Sine qua non, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
103
Feist Publ’ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991).
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other works but rather independently created by the author with some level
of creativity.104 This is not a requirement for novelty, as similar works may be
original but not novel.105 Provided that the similarity is not due to copying,
similar works may be deemed original.106
The requirement of originality is also evident in the copyright
infringement test. For a plaintiff to establish infringement, “two elements
must be proven: (1) ownership of a valid copyright, and (2) copying of
constituent elements of the work that are original.”107 The ownership element
is comprised of five separate parts; however, a copyright registration is prima
facie evidence of ownership.108 The second element of copying is also broken
down but into just two separate parts.109 The first part questions whether the
defendant used the plaintiff’s work as a prototype or inspiration when
creating his own work.110 If the defendant used the plaintiff’s work in this
way, one may conclude copying likely occurred.111 However, the court must
still determine whether the copying is actionable.112 The second part of the
copying element thus questions whether the copying rose to the level of
infringement.113 To establish that copying is actionable, a plaintiff must show
(1) access to the copyrighted work, (2) substantial similarity between the
copyrighted and uncopyrighted works, and (3) that the defendant’s copying
extended to the plaintiff’s original expression.114 This test for infringement
differs from the test for trademark infringement because copyright
infringement does not require courts to inquire into the likelihood of
confusion.115
Despite the differences between trademark and copyright law, concurrent
104

Id.
Id.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 361.
108
4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13:01 (2021)
(These five parts are: the “(1) originality in the author; (2) copyrightability of the subject
matter; (3) a national point of attachment to the work, such as to permit a claim of copyright;
(4) compliance with applicable statutory formalities; and (5) (if the plaintiff is not the
author) a transfer of rights or other relationship between the author and the plaintiff so as to
constitute the plaintiff as the valid copyright claimant.”).
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Stillman v. Leo Burnett Co., 720 F. Supp. 1353, 1358 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
115
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 108, § 13:03 n.2.3.
105
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protection for a single work is possible. In the past, these two types of
intellectual property worked somewhat synergistically. Whether appreciated
by the public and intellectual property commenters, “[o]verlapping
copyright and trademark protection . . . means that . . . creators receive all
the benefits flowing from both the copyright regime and the trademark
system.”116 However, due to the unprecedented nature of Pitbull’s sound
marks (and similar marks to follow), the differences between trademark and
copyright law are clearer, placing the two in direct opposition with one
another.
III. PROBLEM
The USPTO granted Pitbull two trademarks, both in classes relating to
music performance.117 In granting Pitbull’s trademarks, the USPTO
essentially acknowledged that Pitbull’s yell had acquired distinctiveness.
While the USPTO’s recognition was “noteworthy,”118 it raises questions
about the enforcement and licensing of a sound mark in music recordings.
A.

Enforcement

Musicians, like Pitbull, will seek protection for a sound in a copyrighted
song. Thus, if a person copies such a mark in a way that constitutes both
trademark and copyright infringement, both the owner of the trademark and
the owner of the copyright may file a claim of infringement. However, a line
of cases based on a misunderstanding of Supreme Court precedent would
render this type of mark unenforceable.119 While the mark would be highly
beneficial to musicians seeking to protect their brands, issues with
enforcement of the mark should be taken into consideration.
The USPTO registered Pitbull’s trademarks in 2019.120 With his marks
being the first known registered sound marks in sound recordings,121 the
Supreme Court has yet to address this specific type of mark. Nevertheless, the
Court’s past holdings are implicated when considering enforcement of this
116

Viva R. Moffat, Mutant Copyrights and Backdoor Patents: The Problem of Overlapping
Intellectual Property Protection, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1473, 1474 (2004).
117
Trademarks are classified in forty-five different classes based on the goods or services
they identify. See TMEP, supra note 38, § 1400.
118
McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 189.
119
1 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 6:15.
120
The mark is a sound. The mark consists of a man yelling “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO” in
falsetto with “E” drawn out followed by a “U” sound, Registration No. 5,877,076; The mark is
a sound. The mark consists of a man yelling “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO” in falsetto with “E”
drawn out followed by a “U” sound, Registration No. 5,877,077.
121
McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 189.
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type of mark. The Supreme Court’s decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth
Century Film Corp. poses unintended consequences on sound trademarks
found in songs.122 Due to a general misunderstanding of the Court’s holding,
some lower courts have extended the Supreme Court’s holding to preclude
concurrent claims for copyright and trademark infringement.123 Under this
expansive reading of the Supreme Court’s Dastar holding, artists with
trademarks in musical sound recordings would be unable to enforce their
trademarks.
In Dastar, the Supreme Court addressed the applicability of the Lanham
Act to a formerly copyrighted work in the public domain.124 Specifically, the
issue before the Court was whether § 43 of the Lanham Act prevents
unaccredited copying of uncopyrighted work.125 The Court answered the
question in the negative, unanimously holding that the word “origin” in § 43
of the Lanham Act denotes the producer of the physical goods and not the
creator of the intellectual property.126 In effect, the Court’s holding means
that once a copyrighted work falls into the public domain, authors of such
works cannot use trademark law as a means to force copiers to give them
credit. However, to understand the case’s implications, it is helpful to
understand the underlying facts.
In 1948, Twentieth Century Fox (Fox) acquired exclusive television rights
to Dwight D. Eisenhower’s World War II book, Crusades in Europe, from the
book’s publisher, Doublesday.127 Fox arranged for another corporation to
produce the television series, which in turn assigned its copyright in the series
to Fox.128 While Doublesday renewed its copyright in the book in 1975, Fox
failed to renew the copyright on the television series, and the show entered
the public domain in 1977.129 In 1988, Fox again obtained the book’s
television rights and began licensing the right to distribute the television
series.130 Seven years later, the defendant, Dastar, purchased beta cam tapes
of the original series, copied and edited them, then released and sold the

122

See 1 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 6:15.
See, e.g., Conf. Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., No. 3:2006-76, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46955, at *37–39 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Lions Gate Ent. Inc. v. TD Ameritrade Servs. Co.,
170 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
124
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 25, 31 (2003).
125
Id. at 25.
126
Id. at 37.
127
Id. at 25.
128
Id. at 25–26.
129
Id. at 26.
130
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26.
123
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series as World War II Campaigns in Europe.131 This repackaged series did
not mention Fox, the book, or the original series producers.132 Rather, the
credits simply stated, “DASTAR CORP presents.”133 Shortly thereafter, Fox
sued Dastar, claiming that the defendant’s sale of its television series
constituted “reverse passing off,”134 thus violating § 43(a) of the Lanham
Act.135
The Supreme Court held that § 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not prevent
the unaccredited copying of works in the public domain.136 The Court
reasoned that the Lanham Act was not intended to foster originality or
creativity, nor does it reward innovation.137 However, copyrights and patents
were designed for such purposes.138 The Court noted that “in construing the
Lanham Act, [it] ha[s] been ‘careful to caution against misuse or overextension’ of trademark and related protections into areas traditionally
occupied by patent or copyright.”139 Thus, if the Court had allowed a cause of
action under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act in Dastar, it would have created a
“mutant copyright law” that would interfere with the public’s right to copy
and use expired copyrights.140 Consequently, the “limited times” afforded to
copyrights were essential in the Court’s holding.141
The implications and the scope of the Court’s ruling in Dastar can be
difficult to understand.142 Courts and commentators alike have understood
the Court’s holding differently.143 One intellectual property commentator
noted that the Court’s conclusion originated from an implicit belief that
copyright law is superior to trademark law.144 Regardless of the Court’s
131

Id.
Id. at 27.
133
Id.
134
“Passing off” is when one puts another’s trademark on his own goods. Kehoe
Component Sales, Inc. v. Best Lighting Prods., 796 F.3d 576, 586 (6th Cir. 2015). In this
context, the goods are often of lesser quality. Id. Reverse passing off, then, is when one sells
another’s goods or services claiming them as her own. Id.
135
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 27.
136
Id. at 38.
137
Id. at 34.
138
Id. at 37.
139
Id. at 34.
140
Id.
141
MALLA POLLACK, CORPORATE COUNSEL’S GUIDE TO TRADEMARK LAW § 12:4, Westlaw
CCGTMLAW (database updated July 2021).
142
5 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 27:78.
143
Id.
144
Laura A. Heymann, The Trademark/Copyright Divide, 60 SMU L. REV. 55, 81 (2007).
132
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beliefs, lower courts have misinterpreted and expanded Dastar’s limited
holding.145 For example, lower courts have consistently and unanimously
extended the Supreme Court’s holding to copyrighted works.146 Dastar did
not deal with a copyrighted work because Fox failed to renew its copyright,
and the mark had fallen into the public domain.147 Though the Supreme
Court relied heavily on the fact that the work in question in Dastar was no
longer copyrighted, courts generally apply the Court’s holding regardless of
whether the work in question is copyrighted.148
Furthermore, § 43 of the Lanham Act has two prongs, the “trademark”
prong and the “false advertising” prong. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court
noted that its holding only applied to the “trademark” prong.149 It left the
claims of “false advertising” open.150 Nevertheless, lower courts have applied
the Dastar rule to false advertising claims.
While lower courts have expanded the Supreme Court’s holding in many
other respects,151 there are two readings of the Supreme Court’s holding that
have unintended consequences for sound marks in sound recordings. The
Supreme Court noted its reluctance to extend trademark law into areas
traditionally occupied by copyright law even before Dastar, and some lower
courts have relied on the Court’s reluctance to “expand the scope of the
Lanham Act to cover cases in which the Federal Copyright Act provides an
adequate remedy.”152 The most expansive reading of Dastar has led a few
courts to deny plaintiffs pleading both trademark infringement and
copyright infringement claims, consequently holding that the Copyright Act

145
See generally Tom W. Bell, Misunderestimating Dastar: How the Supreme Court
Unwittingly Revolutionized Copyright Preemption, 65 MD. L. REV. 206 (2006) (discussing how
lower courts have applied Dastar in varying contexts).
146
5 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 27:78.
147
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 26.
148
5 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 27:78.
149
Id.
150
Dastar, 539 U.S. at 37.
151
Bell, supra note 145, at 220–21. Lower courts have relied on Dastar to preempt state
law reverse passing off claims, despite the case only dealing with copyright and federal
reverse passing off claims, without providing a clear rationale as to why Dastar would have
such an effect. Id. Courts have also extended the Supreme Court’s holding to services, though
the court only dealt with goods. Id.
152
MARK S. LEE, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 2:95 (2021).
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precludes Lanham Act claims.153,154
With these expansive views of Dastar and the USPTO’s approval of sound
marks in music recordings, how may sound trademark owners enforce their
marks? These trademarks will be in copyrighted songs. While musicians may
own their own trademarks, they often will not own the copyright to the sound
recording. Rather, record labels usually own the rights to their artists’ sound
recordings under the terms of recording contracts.155 Thus, if both a
copyrighted work and a trademark are infringed, the record label and the
musician could bring their respective claims. Yet, lower courts’ highly
expansive readings of Dastar would limit musicians’ rights to enforce their
trademarks.156 Because some courts extend the Supreme Court’s Dastar
holding to find that the Copyright Act preempts or precludes Lanham Act
claims, trademark owners in this situation would not be able to bring their
infringement claims.157 Instead, the record labels could bring their copyright
infringement claims, and musician-trademark-owners would be left without
153

See, e.g., Conf. Archives, Inc. v. Sound Images, Inc., No. 3:2006-76, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 46955, at *37 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Sleep Sci. Partners v. Lieberman, No. 09-04200 CW,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45385, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Lions Gate Ent. Inc. v. TD Ameritrade
Servs. Co., 170 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2016) (stating that the Copyright Act
preempts the Lanham Act).
154
Some courts rejected overlapping protection of both copyrights and trademarks, and
some barred concurrent claims under the Copyright Act and the Lanham Act even before
Dastar. See, e.g., Shaw v. Lindheim, 919 F.2d 1353, 1364–65 (9th Cir. 1990), overruled by
Skidmore v. Led Zeppelin, 952 F.3d 1051, 1066 (9th Cir. 2020) (overruled on other grounds);
Jeffrey Milstein, Inc. v. Greger, Lawlor, Roth, Inc., 58 F.3d 27, 32 (2d Cir. 1995)
(“Overextension of trade dress protection can undermine restrictions in copyright and
patent law that are designed to avoid monopolization of products and ideas. Consequently,
courts should proceed with caution in assessing claims to unregistered trade dress protection
so as not to undermine the objectives of these other laws.”); see also Comedy III Prod., Inc. v.
New Line Cinema, 200 F.3d 593, 595 (9th Cir. 2000) (“If material covered by copyright law
has passed into the public domain, it cannot then be protected by the Lanham Act without
rendering the Copyright Act a nullity.”); Galerie Furstenberg v. Coffaro, 697 F. Supp. 1282,
1290 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (dismissing a trademark claim because it should have been “brought
under the federal copyright, not trademark, statute”). A clarification of Dastar will still apply
to these cases. See Moffat, supra note 116, at 1527–30 (discussing cases in which copyright
and trademark protection were denied and how the Dastar rule encourages lower courts to
reject claims of concurrent protection).
155
Kessler, supra note 2, at 532.
156
See Conf. Archives, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46955, at *37 (“Claims for copyright
infringement under the Copyright Act, and claims for Trade Dress Infringement under the
Lanham Act are mutually exclusive. . . . If an adequate remedy exists for the Copyright Act,
no remedy lies for the Lanham Act claim.”).
157
Id.; Lions Gate Ent. Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d at 1264 (stating that the Supreme Court has
extended the principle of copyright preemption to the Lanham Act and federal trademark
protection).
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recourse for infringement of their marks. The record label is not required to
bring a copyright infringement suit, however.
One court recited reasons why record labels may neglect to enforce their
copyrights.158 These reasons may include “simple laziness or enforcement
costs, a desire to create goodwill, or a calculation that the infringement
creates an economic complement to the copyrighted work—it actually
benefits the owner.”159 In fact, unauthorized use of copyrighted works have
been shown to make potential customers aware of the original work, leading
customers to become fans of the original work, and ultimately increasing the
use of the original work.160 These effects are evident in the music industry.161
In the music context, musicians often copy, incorporate, and borrow from
existing musical works.162 One form of this “musical borrowing” that has
become prevalent with the rise of hip hop is sampling.163 Sampling is “[a]
process in which sound is taken directly from a recorded medium and
transposed onto a new recording.”164 While it is possible to obtain licenses to
sample already copyrighted music,165 some musicians proceed without such
authorization.166 Nevertheless, sampling, whether authorized or
unauthorized, has been shown to increase music sales in the original work.167
Thus, if a record label sees an economic benefit in the infringement, or simply
chooses not to enforce its mark, the trademark owner would be left even
more vulnerable under a liberal Dastar rule. In that case, while the artist may
158

Jackson v. Roberts, 972 F.3d 25, 41 (2d Cir. 2020).
Id. (quoting Tim Wu, Tolerated Use, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 617, 619 (2008)).
160
David Fagundes, Market Harm, Market Help, and Fair Use, 17 STAN. TECH. L. REV.
359, 378–82 (2014).
161
See Mike Schuster et al., Sampling Increases Music Sales: An Empirical Copyright
Study, 56 AM. BUS. L.J. 177, 196, 206 (2019).
162
Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright
and Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547, 550 (2006).
163
Id. at 552.
164
Will Fulford-Jones, Sampling, GROVE MUSIC ONLINE (Jan. 20, 2001),
https://www.oxfordmusiconline.com/grovemusic/view/10.1093/gmo/9781561592630.001.00
01/omo-9781561592630-e-0000047228?rskey=8uwE4E&result=1.
165
See infra Section III.B.
166
See Arewa, supra note 162, at 580 (discussing Grand Upright v. Warner Bros. Records,
where the artist requested permission to sample the original work but proceeded after denial
of such permission); see also Jackson v. Roberts, 972 F.3d 25, 31 (2d Cir. 2020) (“[I]t is
common for hip-hop mixtapes to include ‘remixes,’ often consisting of new vocal recordings
by the releasing artist, combined with samples of songs by other artists . . . many hip-hop
artists (including [the plaintiff] himself) have created mixtapes that included samples of
recordings of other artists without obtaining permission from either the recording artist or
the copyright holder of the work sampled.” (emphasis added)).
167
Schuster et al., supra note 161, at 178.
159
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have claims against the record label,168 the artist would be barred from
bringing a Lanham Act claim against the copier.
Nevertheless, even if musicians owned both the copyright and trademark,
they could still be barred from bringing both copyright and trademark
claims.169 Most cases that barred concurrent claims have dealt with a single
owner of both the copyright and the trademark.170 Consequently, if the
musicians owned the copyright to the song their sound mark was in, they
may still have no recourse under their trademark claim.171
B.

Licensing

Pitbull uses his yell almost exclusively in his music.172 His yell can be heard
in his own songs and songs in which he is a featured artist.173 This allows
Pitbull to experiment in different genres while assuring his fans that the song
is indeed a Pitbull song.174 Appropriately, he registered one of his marks in a
class for live music recording and another in a class for musical sound and
musical video recordings.175
168

See Jackson v. Roberts, 972 F.3d 25, 41 (2d Cir. 2020) (stating that the plaintiff,
Jackson, would possibly have rights to compel the record label and receive royalties from
damages, but he would not have a right to control the defendant’s use of his song through a
right of publicity claim).
169
See, e.g., Conf. Archives, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46955, at *37; Sleep Sci. Partners,
2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45385, at *12; Lions Gate Ent. Inc. v. TD Ameritrade Servs. Co., 170 F.
Supp. 3d 1249, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
170
See Conf. Archives, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46955, *2 (“Plaintiff developed a
product called Conference Companion and registered that name as a federal trademark.”);
Sleep Sci. Partners, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45385, at *1–2, 4. (“Plaintiff alleges that Sleeping
Well misappropriated its PureSleep Method through Dr. Lieberman and that its website has
the same format, design and feel as Plaintiff's website.”); Lions Gate Ent. Inc., 170 F. Supp. 3d
at 1254 (“This copyright and trademark infringement case arises from Plaintiff Lions Gate
Entertainment, Inc.’s intellectual property rights in the movie Dirty Dancing that Plaintiff
alleges Defendants infringed.”).
171
See Conf. Archives, Inc., 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46955, at *37 (“Claims for copyright
infringement under the Copyright Act, and claims for Trade Dress Infringement under the
Lanham Act are mutually exclusive. . . . If an adequate remedy exists for the Copyright Act,
no remedy lies for the Lanham Act claim.”).
172
Merceus, supra note 14.
173
McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 183.
174
Id.
175
The mark is a sound. The mark consists of a man yelling “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO” in
falsetto with “E” drawn out followed by a “U” sound. Registration No. 5,877,076 (registered
in class 41 for live entertainment services in the nature of live musical performances); The
mark is a sound. The mark consists of a man yelling “EEEEEEEYOOOOOO” in falsetto with
“E” drawn out followed by a “U” sound. Registration No. 5,877,077 (registered in class 9 for
musical sound recordings; musical video recordings).
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At least one court has contemplated the interplay of music licensing and
sound trademarks.176 In Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., a musician, Astrud
Oliveira, attempted to recover damages for trademark infringement due to
the defendants’ use of her song in a potato chip commercial.177 The
defendants paid over $200,000 in licensing fees to use the song but did not
seek Oliveira’s permission, believing that she retained no rights in the song.178
Oliveira, however, argued that she possessed an unregistered trademark in
her signature performance of the song “The Girl from Ipanema,” and thus,
the defendants were unauthorized in the use of her mark in their commercial,
thus causing a likelihood of consumer confusion.179
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit disagreed with
Oliveira’s argument.180 While the court held that musicians could possibly
register a trademark for their signature performances, the court determined
Congress was better fit to extend trademark law to protect signature
performances.181 Notably, the court reasoned that artists, who had licensed
paying entities to use their songs, would be able to bring suit for trademark
infringement if the court agreed with Oliveira.182 While the court found no
trademark rights in Oliveira, one of the case’s principles is important when
contemplating sound trademarks in musical sound recordings: both the
trademark and the song itself should be licensed to avoid trademark and
copyright infringement.
While the trademark and the song itself must be licensed, the licensing
requirements for both differ. The differing requirements will inevitably cause
problems for musician-sound-mark-owners. Trademark licensing requires
that owners exert control over their licensees and the quality of their products
for a license to be valid.183 Trademark licensing was prohibited until the
passage of the Lanham Act, which now allows a mark to be used by “related
companies.”184 While licensing is no longer prohibited, the Lanham Act does
not define “quality,” nor does it define “control.”185 Courts have been left to
define quality and control on a case-by-case basis, leading to different
176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185

See Oliveira v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 251 F.3d 56 (2d Cir. 2001).
Id. at 57–58.
Id. at 58.
Id. at 60–61.
Id. at 62.
Id. at 62–63.
Oliveira, 251 F.3d at 63.
Calboli, supra note 9, at 356.
Lanham Act § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 1055.
See id.; Lanham Act § 45, § 1127.
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interpretations of quality control as well as inconsistent and contradictory
results.186
Several courts have inquired into whether trademark owners exercised
“adequate” control.187 These courts assessed whether control was adequate
based on how trademark owners guaranteed product quality.188 Some
methods used to guarantee product quality included regular testing
procedures, requirements to buy certain supplies from certain sources, and
sending samples.189 Yet, these courts never articulated a specific test to
determine adequate control.190 Other courts determined that “actual” control
was required rather than merely contractual control.191 One court noted that
in the absence of actual control, a trademark could still be canceled even if
the contract contained quality control provisions.192 Conversely, some courts
even went as far as to hold that a license was valid regardless of control as
long as the quality of the product remained the same and the public was not
deceived.193 With each new standard developed, the case-by-case basis
approach remained. Accordingly, trademark owners are left without
guidance as to what constitutes a valid license and how much control to
exert.194
Furthermore, courts are inconsistent in determining who can monitor
quality control.195 Some courts have held that the trademark owner is not
required to monitor quality control, and third parties or licensees may do
so.196 Nevertheless, the Lanham Act provides that trademark owners who fail
to exert quality control may forfeit their trademarks if consumers are

186

Calboli, supra note 9, at 364–65.
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart’s Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 358, 368–69 (2d Cir. 1959);
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1962); Alligator Co. v. Robert Bruce, Inc., 176 F. Supp. 377, 378–79 (E.D. Pa. 1959).
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Calboli, supra note 9, at 368.
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Id; see also Embedded Moments, Inc. v. Int’l Silver Co., 648 F. Supp. 187, 194–95
(E.D.N.Y. 1986).
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Calboli, supra note 9, at 368.
191
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670 (7th Cir. 1964).
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misled.197 This provision in the Lanham Act has been met with differing
attitudes from courts. Although most courts are neither extremely lenient
nor strict, some courts are reluctant to find invalid licenses and are fairly
lenient, while others are strict and seem eager to invalidate licenses.198
This wide range of precedent may concern musician-trademark-owners
seeking to license sound trademarks in music recordings. First, musicians,
like other trademark owners, would be unsure how much control they would
need to exert.199 Second, there is no guidance on how to measure quality in
music recordings.200 The wide range of uses of music adds to the difficulty of
a quality control requirement in this context. If musicians license their
trademarks for use in another’s song, how should they guarantee quality?
Product manufacturers can send samples, require certain supplies, or have
testing procedures;201 however, these methods do not translate well to music
recordings. While most products may be analyzed utilizing multiple senses,
humans experience music largely through their ears.202 A person’s ability to
hear through his or her ears impacts how quality could be determined in
licensed sound marks because each person’s brain interprets and retains
musical information uniquely.203 What one person—or a potential juror—
may deem similar quality, another could disagree. For example, some jurors
may lack the auditory skills necessary for quality control determination
because they are tone-deaf.204 One copyright commentator properly
explained how tone-deafness might affect a juror: “Ultimately, someone that
is tone deaf lacks in the ability to properly perceive or remember musical
sounds. This kind of impairment could easily lead to improper
rulings . . . .”205 Finally, the wide range of precedent could cause musician to
be unsure whether they are required to monitor quality control or if a third
party could do so.206
Although sound trademarks in music recordings are novel,207 licensing the
trademarks would require the trademark owner to maintain control of the
197

Lanham Act § 14(3), 15 U.S.C. § 1064(5).
3 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 18:55.
199
See Calboli, supra note 9, at 374.
200
See id. at 371 (dealing only with traditional marks).
201
Id. at 368 n.145.
202
See Joseph M. Santiago, Note, The “Blurred Lines” of Copyright Law Setting a New
Standard for Copyright Infringement in Music, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 289, 303 (2017).
203
See id.
204
Id. at 304.
205
Id. (discussing tone deafness in copyright infringement context).
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See Calboli, supra note 9, at 375.
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See McNaughton et al., supra note 5, at 189.
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nature and quality of the licensed products just as any other trademark
would.208 Licensing the song itself, however, differs greatly. Music has been
labeled a troublemaker in copyright law,209 and this label is partly because a
single song may have multiple copyrights with multiple owners. The
Copyright Act lists eight non-exclusive categories of “works of authorship”
that may receive copyright protection.210 These categories include musical
works and sound recordings.211 On one hand, a musical work is the song’s
notes and accompanying lyrics.212 Ordinarily, the author or composer of the
musical work owns the copyright, or by assignment, a music publisher owns
the copyright.213 Because multiple people often write songs, more than one
person may own the copyright to a musical work.214 The copyright in a
musical work protects the right to reproduce the work, create a derivative of
the work, distribute the work, publicly perform the work, and publicly
display the work.215
On the other hand, a sound recording is a work resulting from fixed
musical, spoken, or other sound.216 In essence, a sound recording is a
recorded audio performance of a musical work.217 Under the terms of basic
recording contracts, artists create their sound recordings as “works made for
hire” for the record label.218 If, however, the artist did not make the work for
hire, recording contracts often include provisions in which an artist assigns
all rights, titles, and interests in the sound recording to the label.219 In either
case, the record label owns the rights to the sound recording.220 The copyright
in a sound recording protects the rights to reproduce the recording, create
derivative works, distribute the recording, and publicly perform the

208
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1, 3 (2001).
213
Id. at 4.
214
Tomlinson & Nielander, supra note 209, at 285.
215
17 U.S.C. § 106.
216
17 U.S.C. § 101.
217
See Binder, supra note 212, at 4.
218
Kessler, supra note 2, at 532.
219
Id. at 532 n.78.
220
Id.
209

516

LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 16:3

recording digitally.221 This dichotomy of musical works and sound
recordings plays an important role in music licensing.
Third parties’ intended uses of a song determines from whom they must
obtain a license.222 A third party seeking to use a recorded song must obtain
a license from the owner of the sound recording and the owner of the musical
work.223 Additionally, the intended use also determines the type of license
required.224 For example, in order to stream songs, interactive music
platforms, such as Spotify, must acquire a public performance license from
the owners of the sound recording and the musical work, as well as a
reproduction license from the owner of the musical work.225
The music industry widely uses music licenses, and due to the vast amount
of licenses required for a single project, copyright owners do not tend to
negotiate licenses individually.226 The copyright owner, such as the record
label, will often license the sound recording to distributors, who in turn
license it to the ultimate user.227 Assuming that the trademark is licensed in
the same way, musicians would license their trademarks to distributors, and
distributors would, in turn, sublicense the trademark to the ultimate user.
However, courts have rarely addressed the quality control requirement in the
context of sublicensing.228 Given that owners of sound marks in music may
often utilize sublicensing, this adds even more uncertainty for the owners of
these marks and leaves them vulnerable to the possibility of a canceled
trademark. One suggestion offered to avoid this issue is that trademark
owners simply license directly to the sub-licensee.229 Yet, even without the
added complication of sublicensing, as mentioned before, musicians are still
left without guidance on what constitutes quality control. Exerting actual
control in the music context is less practical due to the wide range of uses for
music and the sheer volume of licenses required to complete a single work or
221

17 U.S.C. § 106.
James A. Johnson, Thou Shalt Not Steal: A Primer on Music Licensing, 80 N.Y. ST. BAR
J. 23, 23 (2008).
223
Tomlinson & Nielander, supra note 209, at 286.
224
Johnson, supra note 222, at 23.
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17 U.S.C. § 114(d)(2)(A)(i); Mary LaFrance, Music Modernization and the Labyrinth
of Streaming, 2 BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 310, 314 (2018); Jeff Price, The
Definitive Guide to Spotify Royalties, VI.BE, 1, 14, https://vi.be/files/research/the-definitiveguide-to-spotify-royalties-by-jeff-price-3.pdf (last visited Mar. 9, 2022).
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Arewa, supra note 162, at 637.
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Price, supra note 225, at 5.
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William M. Brochard & Richard M. Osman, Trademark Sublicensing and Quality
Control, 70 TRADEMARK REP. 99, 100 (1980).
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stream an album. Furthermore, music licensing is already expensive. Still, the
administrative costs of the quality control requirement will be added to an
already expensive process.230 While musicians nowadays rely on music
streaming rather than just album sales,231 these administrative costs and
control requirements may be too burdensome on music platforms that are
already highly susceptible to losses.232
The current music licensing scheme is complicated and highly
regulated.233 Yet, hip-hop and R&B, the genres this type of trademark is
predicted to be used most in,234 rely heavily on music licensing for samples.235
Thus if a hip-hop artist, for example, were to obtain licenses for a song
containing a sound trademark, the artist would have the added hurdle of
trademark licensing and the quality control requirement. As detailed above,
trademark owners have no clear guidance on the requirement.236 This issue
may be worsened for owners of sound trademarks in musical sound
recordings. Correspondingly, licensing songs with sound trademarks would
be even more complicated and time-consuming than it already is.
IV. PROPOSAL
Trademark law provides an avenue through which musicians may create
and enforce a personal brand apart from their relationships with their record
230

See Parks, supra note 77, at 559.
Paula Mejia, The Success Of Streaming Has Been Great For Some, But Is There a Better
Way?, NPR (July 22, 2019, 6:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/22/743775196/thesuccess-of-streaming-has-been-great-for-some-but-is-there-a-better-way.
232
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UCLA ENT. L. REV. 45, 57–58 (2014) (detailing that the current music licensing scheme
jeopardizes Spotify’s ability to be profitable in the long term).
233
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their article, among these is the difficulty to determine “market-rate benchmarks for both
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determined administratively or by a rate court. Id. at 141. Further, there are “different
transaction costs for licensing rights” based on the use. Id. at 143.
234
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https://www.miamiherald.com/miami-com/miami-com-news/article242059686.html.
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labels and their music careers.237 By granting Pitbull’s sound marks, the
USPTO paved the way for musicians to protect critical components of their
music personas.238 As such, sound trademarks in music recordings are an
effective tool for musicians, as well as the consumer the Lanham Act seeks to
protect.239 An expansive reading of Dastar may render this type of mark
enforceable, and appropriately, the Supreme Court should clarify its holding
to ensure owners of this type of mark may enforce their sound marks. The
Court should explicitly hold that plaintiffs may bring concurrent copyright
and trademark claims. Additionally, because the quality control requirement
of trademark licensing may prove to be an added difficulty for sound marks
in musical recordings, Congress should amend the Lanham Act so musicians
may easily license their marks. This amendment would dispose of the quality
control requirement for sound trademarks allowing musicians (and other
sound mark owners) to freely license their sounds.
A.

Enforcement

Sound trademarks within musical recordings implicate both trademark
and copyright law. Although sound marks in music recordings are novel, if
copiers infringe on musicians’ trademarks, musicians should still be able to
enforce their trademarks as other trademark owners do. Yet, due to the overly
expansive readings of Dastar, musicians may be prevented from bringing
their trademark claims. In barring trademark claims where copyright law
provides an adequate remedy and altogether holding that the Copyright Act
preempts or precludes the Lanham Act, courts have expanded the Supreme
Court’s holding in ways the Court did not predict.240 In light of these lower
court decisions, the Supreme Court should clarify its Dastar holding.
The Supreme Court’s holding in Dastar was limited.241 The case involved
an owner of a formerly copyrighted work attempting to use trademark law to
force a copier to give credit.242 The Court ultimately held that trademark law
could not be used in such a manner.243 Behind the Supreme Court’s holding
was a simple policy rationale: Congress designed copyrights, not the Lanham
Act, to protect originality.244 Therefore, the Supreme Court stated it was
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244

See Kessler, supra note 2, at 546–48.
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“‘careful to caution against misuse or over-extension’ of trademark and
related protections into areas traditionally occupied by patent or
copyright.”245 Had the Court interpreted the Lanham Act to protect authors
of formerly copyrighted works in the public domain, it would have created a
“mutant copyright law” that would have interfered with the public’s right to
use expired copyrighted works.246
Nonetheless, lower courts have used the Supreme Court’s holding to limit
double recovery and to bar concurrent copyright infringement and
trademark infringement claims.247 When the Court first issued its decision,
many understood correctly: one could not bring suit arising out of the
Lanham Act to claim ownership of a formerly copyrighted work now in the
public domain.248 But as time went on, lower courts began to understand
Dastar differently.249 Courts no longer considered the policy rationale behind
the Supreme Court’s holding and solely focused on how the Supreme Court
reached its policy goals, namely interpreting the word “origin”
in § 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act.250 The Supreme Court held that “origin”
does not mean the source or creator of the intellectual property but rather
the producer of the goods. This shift in focus from the policy behind the
Court’s holding to the means the Court used to reach its policy goals has led
to lower courts expanding the Supreme Court’s limited holding.251
With this shift away from policy in mind, the Supreme Court should
restate that plaintiffs may bring concurrent claims arising under the Lanham
Act and Copyright Act when overlapping protection of the subject matter is
available. Each arena of intellectual property law serves its own special goals.
If multiple forms of intellectual property protect a single work, owners of the
works should be able to bring claims arising under each type of intellectual
property.252 However, when the copyright has lapsed or the work is
245
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uncopyrightable, a plaintiff may only be barred from bringing a trademark
claim when bringing a copyright claim is disguised as a § 43(a) claim, as was
the case in Dastar.253
This new rule would clarify the existing Dastar holding, which did not
address the possibility of concurrent overlapping protection at all.254 The rule
also would further the Supreme Court’s policy rationales behind the Dastar
holding. Under this new rule, a plaintiff would still be unable to use the
Lanham Act to force copiers to attribute credit of works in the public
domain.255 Further, this proposed rule provides a solution to the problems
that emanate from concurrent protection.256 Musician-sound-mark-owners
would be able to bring trademark claims against copiers regardless of whether
an adequate remedy lies in the Copyright Act. This allows these owners to
bring a claim under the Lanham Act regardless of whether the record label
chooses to bring a claim under the Copyright Act.257
Additionally, the proposed rule would settle the contradictory holdings in
federal courts. While some courts have held that the Copyright Act precludes
or preempts the Lanham Act,258 other courts have allowed plaintiffs to bring
concurrent claims under both acts.259 For example, the United States Court
(“[Hostility to intellectual property rights] ignores the different nature of each form of
intellectual property: each form was created to protect a particular aspect of intellectual
productivity.”).
253
Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 38 (2003).
254
Moffat, supra note 116, at 1526. Dastar addressed sequential protection but not
concurrent protection. Id.
255
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256
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257
See Jackson v. Roberts, 972 F.3d 25, 41–42 (2d Cir. 2020).
258
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46955, at *37 (W.D. Pa. 2010); Sleep Sci. Partners v. Lieberman, No. 09-04200 CW, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 25385, at *12 (N.D. Cal. 2010); Lions Gate Ent. Inc. v. TD Ameritrade Servs. Co.,
170 F. Supp. 3d 1249, 1264 (C.D. Cal. 2016).
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Am. Soc’y for Testing & Materials v. Public.Resource.Org, Inc., 896 F.3d 437, 453
(D.C. Cir. 2018) (holding that Dastar did not apply to the case and genuine issues of material
fact precluded summary judgment of copyright and trademark claims); Lyons P’ship v.
Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 387 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that the plaintiff sued for among other
things, unfair competition and trademark dilution under the Lanham Act as well as
copyright infringement); Ward v. Andrews McMeel Publ’g, LLC, 963 F. Supp. 2d 222, 236
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of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit (Fifth Circuit) stated:
The federal Copyright Act does not preempt the federal
Lanham Act, or vice-versa. In fact, it is common practice for
copyright owners to sue for both infringement under the
1976 Copyright Act and unfair competition under the
Lanham Act. Such a litigation posture has never been
disallowed by the courts on grounds of either preemption or
impermissible double recovery.260
A clarification of the Dastar holding would affirm the holdings of courts, like
the Fifth Circuit, that have explicitly allowed plaintiffs to bring concurrent
claims. Furthermore, the proposed rule affirms law already found in the
Copyright Act. The Copyright Act explicitly provides that no part of the Act
“limits any rights or remedies under any other Federal statute.”261
Nonetheless, lower courts have used the current Dastar holding to contradict
the Copyright Act.262
Lastly, this new rule would not completely overturn over a decade of cases.
While the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that its holding only applied
to the “trademark” prong of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, courts have
often extended the Supreme Court’s holding to the “false advertising”
prong.263 The proposed rule would allow courts to continue applying Dastar
to the “false advertising” prong of Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.264 Under
the proposed rule, lower courts that apply Dastar to the false advertising
prong of Section 43(a) would not bar concurrent claims for trademark and
copyright infringement, as the rule would only apply when a copyrighted
work has fallen into the public domain. More importantly, intellectual
property law is everchanging and likely to expand.265 Dastar provided little
guidance,266 yet this new rule gives courts more guidance while allowing the
expansion of intellectual property. New marks, like Pitbull’s sound marks,
Lanham Act claim cannot be preempted by the Copyright Act. With an exception not
relevant here, ‘nothing in [the preemption provision] or elsewhere in the [Copyright] Act
annuls or limits any rights or remedies under any other Federal Statute.’” (quoting 1 NIMMER
& NIMMER, supra note 108, § 1.19)).
260
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261
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are allowed to be enforced under this new rule, unlike under the liberal
interpretations of Dastar.267
B.

Licensing

Just as musicians should be able to enforce their sound marks, they should
similarly be able to license the marks in songs with ease. The potential
implications of the quality control requirement on sound marks in music are
undeniable. Courts have defined quality control on a case-by-case basis
resulting in inconsistent and contradictory results.268 While some courts
differ on the type of control required, and other courts differ on the
requirement of product quality, some courts differ on who may even exert
control.269 No matter the result of the case-by-case analysis, owners of sound
marks in songs will be left without guidance on what constitutes a valid
trademark license. Furthermore, music licensing is already complicated
without the added obstacle of a quality control requirement.270 Owners of
sound marks in music recordings would benefit from an amendment to the
Lanham Act disposing of the quality control requirement for sound marks.
This new licensing standard would provide flexibility for licensors and
licensees while still protecting against consumer deception.
The current quality control standard has its statutory basis in § 45 of the
Lanham Act, particularly the “related company” definition.271 This definition
states that a related company is “any person whose use of a mark is controlled
by the owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods
or services on or in connection with which the mark is used.”272 However,
this definition should be amended to allow for a flexible approach towards
sound marks. A “related company” should instead be defined as “any person
whose use of a mark, not consisting of a sound mark, is controlled by the
owner of the mark with respect to the nature and quality of the goods or

267
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services on or in connection with which the mark is used.”273 This
amendment would exempt sound marks from the quality control
requirement, thus freeing owners of sound marks in music recordings to
license songs without an added difficulty of the quality control requirement
or fear of a naked licensing claim.
Considering the current state of trademark licensing, musician-soundmark-owners may be left confused as to how to validly license their marks.274
While the quality control requirement does some good in product
distribution and marketing by ensuring the same or similar quality in
products,275 these benefits do not translate well to sound trademarks in music
recordings. A change in the current quality control requirement removes the
guesswork for owners of sound marks and allows these owners to freely
license their sounds without claims of naked licensing potentially being used
as a defense or counterclaim by alleged infringers.276
In light of the current licensing scheme, musicians will not be in a position
to exert actual control. While some courts have held contractual control is
enough, some courts have held otherwise.277 With the quality control
requirement disposed of for sound recordings, owners of sound marks in
music would be free to license their trademarks to third parties without fear
of a court declaring their license to be invalid because the owner did not exert
actual control. Additionally, a focus merely on the quality of the product in
music licensing is not feasible. Disposal of the quality control requirement in
this context would remove the focus from the quality of the music, which is
a highly subjective analysis. Rather, with the requirement disposed of, the
consumer instead of a court would be able to determine the quality of the
music. Because, as one court noted, the consuming public is the best judge to
determine the quality of the product.278
273
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Most importantly, a flexible approach to sound mark licensing still
achieves the goal of the Lanham Act: eliminating consumer confusion or
deception.279 The result of a successful naked licensing defense or
counterclaim is that both the copier and the trademark owner are allowed to
continue using the mark in question.280 Interestingly, a trademark owner’s
failure to control a licensee’s use of the mark does not necessarily mean
consumers will be deceived.281 Rather, consumer deception arises most when
licensors and licensees act in bad faith.282 When dealing with products, both
parties to a licensing agreement may act in bad faith by neglecting to notify
the public of variations in product quality, leading the public to be
deceived.283 However, in music, sound mark owners do not seem likely to
license their sounds to another musician solely wanting to capitalize on the
trademark owner’s fame.284 This reduces the likelihood of consumer
deception in this type of mark. Furthermore, a disposal of the quality control
requirement for sound marks simply shifts the focus away from the licensor
to the actions of the licensees. If the public is deceived, courts should shift
their focus to whether the licensee acted in bad faith.
Disposal of the quality control requirement in sound trademarks—which
would otherwise, in turn, affect licensing in the sound recording—also
furthers the goals of the Copyright Act for music. As noted, the goal of
copyright law is to foster innovation.285 By disposing of the quality control
requirement in sound trademarks, licensors of sound recordings are left
without an added complication. Accordingly, they will be left to grapple with
the current music licensing scheme, which has not completely deterred music
borrowing thus far.286
279

Park ’n Fly, Inc. v. Dollar Park & Fly, Inc., 469 U.S. 189, 198 (1985).
Parks, supra note 77, at 558.
281
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See Astride Howell, Sample This!, 28 L.A. LAW. 24, 28 (2005) (“The process of digital
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accomplished through more novel technological methods. . . . Dangermouse voices what
most musicians and producers feel when faced with the strictures of copyright law’ ‘Mashing
is so easy. It takes years to learn how to play the guitar and write your own songs. It takes a
few weeks of practice with a turntable to make people dance and smile. It takes a few hours
to crank out something good with some software. So with such a low barrier to entry,
everyone jumps in and starts immediately being creative.’”). Howell does note, however, that
“[t]he costs associated with obtaining the necessary licenses may curb the types of songs that
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Although music licensing is time-consuming and complicated, it has
benefits.287 For centuries, musicians have borrowed others’ music.288
Borrowing is so common that it is recognized as “fundamental” to the music
creation process.289 One form of this borrowing, sampling, has become
increasingly prominent in the record industry.290 Though commenters
disagree on how copyright law should treat sampling, its effects on the music
industry are unquestionable.291 Sampling has been found to increase
innovation in the music industry and increase sales in music.292 Music artists’
income from record sales has decreased in the digital age;293 however, an
increase due to sampling could increase these artists’ income.294 This use of
music licensing, in particular, has been shown to increase sales of the original

will be sampled and used for new works.” Id. at 30 (emphasis added). Regardless, some
artists sample songs without proper clearance. For a discussion of unauthorized sampling
and a proposed solution, see Ryan Lloyd, Note, Unauthorized Digital Sampling in the
Changing Music Landscape, 22 J. INTELL. PROP. 143 (2014).
287
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288
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discusses the pervasiveness of musical borrowing throughout history. Id. at 612–19. While
Arewa’s article is informative, a look at the website WhoSampled.com further proves how
often artists copy from each other. See WHOSAMPLED, whosampled.com (last visited Feb. 28,
2022). Significantly, when examining the effects of sampling on music sales, legal
commentators used WhoSampled.com to aid their research. Schuster et al., supra note 161,
at 203. The website provides visitors an opportunity to “[d]ig deeper into music by
discovering direct connections among over 830,000 songs and 266,000 artists, from HipHop, Rap and R&B via Electronic / Dance through to Rock, Pop, Soul, Funk, Reggae, Jazz,
Classical and beyond.” WHOSAMPLED, supra note 288. For example, a search of Pitbull
reveals over 200 samples, 70 covers, and 270 remixes. Pitbull, WHOSAMPLED,
https://www.whosampled.com/Pitbull/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2022). In essence, Pitbull has
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Pitbull to protect his yell, displays a specific example of musical borrowing in modern times.
The song, by J Balvin and Willy William, samples another Willy William song, Voodoo Song.
Mi Gente, WHOSAMPLED, https://www.whosampled.com/J-Balvin/Mi-Gente/ (last visited
Feb. 28, 2022).
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work.295 With the quality control requirement disposed of, musicians will
receive the benefits of increased sales296 without the added administrative fees
associated with the quality control requirement.
Luckily, consumers will not have music prices increased due to the
additional licensing cost.297 Likewise, music platforms whose costs are
constantly changing will not see the increased cost from the quality control
requirement. This is because the administrative fees associated with
trademark licensing quality control requirements would not be added to the
cost of licensing music.298 By allowing a more flexible licensing approach and
disposing of the quality control requirement for sound marks, musicians are
allowed to better protect their trademarks, continue contributing to the
advancement of music, and prices remain unchanged to the consumer’s
benefit.
V. CONCLUSION
Sound trademarks in songs are an effective way of communicating with
consumers,299 and trademarks play an indispensable role in brand protection
for both individuals and companies.300 With many artists having unique call
signs,301 this type of mark may become prevalent in the music industry.302 Yet,
because both trademark and copyright laws are implicated in this type of
mark, problems will undoubtedly arise. When the Supreme Court first
295
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note 161, at 206–07. Ultimately, the data showed that “to a 99.99% degree of statistical
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178.
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decided Dastar, the holding was understood to mean that an author could
not use the Lanham Act to force copiers to give credit for work in the public
domain.303 Yet, as time went on, lower courts began expanding the Court’s
holding,304 even to the point of precluding claims of trademark infringement
when the Copyright Act provides a remedy.305 The Supreme Court did not
predict such an expansive reading of Dastar,306 and the Court should clarify
its holding. The Supreme Court should restate that plaintiffs may bring
concurrent claims arising under the Lanham Act and Copyright Act when
overlapping protection of the subject matter is available. However, when the
copyright has lapsed, or the work is uncopyrightable, a plaintiff may only be
barred from bringing a trademark claim when bringing a copyright claim is
disguised as a Section 43(a) claim.
This proposed rule provides a solution to the problems with concurrent
protection.307 Musician-sound-mark-owners would be able to bring
trademark claims against copiers regardless of whether an adequate remedy
lies in the Copyright Act. The ability to bring concurrent claims would allow
intellectual property rights holders to bring a claim under the Lanham Act
even if their record label chooses or fails to bring a claim under the Copyright
Act.308
Furthermore, the quality control requirement for trademark licensing
adds difficulty to the already arduous music licensing process.309 The quality
control requirement has been defined on a case-by-case basis, resulting in
inconsistent and, at times, contradictory holdings.310 Therefore, owners of
sound marks in music recordings would benefit from an amendment to the
Lanham Act disposing of the quality control requirement for sound marks.
Disposal of the quality control requirement for sound marks would provide
flexibility for licensors and licensees while still protecting against consumer
deception. Sound mark owners do not seem likely to license their sounds to
another musician solely wanting to capitalize on the trademark owner’s fame,
303
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and consumer deception often arises when both licensors and licensees act in
bad faith.311
Additionally, although music licensing is complicated, it has benefits.312
Because one use of licensing, sampling, is shown to increase music sales in
the original work, musicians may generate more income from record sales,313
and consumers do not have to pay an increased price in music because of the
administrative costs of the quality control requirement.314 By allowing a more
flexible licensing approach, musicians are allowed to continue contributing
to the advancement of music, and prices are left unchanged to the benefit of
the consumer. By solving issues that arise with sound marks in song
recordings, musicians benefit from the added protection of their brands, and
consumer deception is ultimately prevented.
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